Indus Water Treaty: Key Agreement Between India & Pakistan | UPSC

Introduction

• Negotiated in 1960 between India and Pakistan as a key transboundary water-sharing mechanism.
• Divides the control of six rivers in the Indus River basin between the two nations.
• India controls the eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi) while Pakistan controls the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab).
•   India issued a formal notice to Pakistan in January 2023 seeking amendments to the treaty, expressing dissatisfaction with the dispute resolution mechanism.
•   A new notice issued in mid-2024 under Article XII (3) includes a call for a ‘review and modification‘ of the treaty.
•   Article XII (3) allows changes through a new ratified agreement between both countries.

History Behind the Indus Water Treaty

• Pre-Independence: Before partition, the Indus basin’s six rivers (Indus, Sutlej, Beas, Ravi, Jhelum, and Chenab) flowed through both India and Pakistan, serving as a common water network for the region.
• Partition and Water Disputes: The partition of India in 1947 raised concerns regarding water distribution, as the rivers flowed from India into Pakistan, creating fears in Pakistan that India could potentially control and restrict water flow.
• Inter-Dominion Accord (1948): In May 1948, the Inter-Dominion Accord was established, wherein India agreed to release water to Pakistan in exchange for annual payments. However, the arrangement proved to be insufficient and temporary, leading to the need for a more permanent solution.
• Indus Water Treaty (1960): With the World Bank’s mediation, India and Pakistan signed the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in 1960. The treaty outlined detailed provisions for water distribution between the two nations, helping address disputes and foster cooperation.

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Main Provisions of the Indus Water Treaty

• Eastern Rivers Allocation: India received exclusive rights over the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas), with an annual flow of 33 million acre-feet (MAF).
• Western Rivers Allocation: Pakistan gained control over the three western rivers (Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum) with an annual flow of 80 MAF.
• Utilization of Western Rivers by India: India is permitted limited irrigation and non-consumptive uses (such as hydroelectric power generation and navigation) on the western rivers. It can also store up to 3.75 MAF of water for conservation and flood control purposes.
• Water Division Ratio: India received 20% of the total water of the Indus system, while 80% was allocated to Pakistan.
• Dispute Resolution Mechanism: The IWT established a three-tier dispute resolution mechanism:
  • • Permanent Indus Commission for routine matters and consultations.
    • Neutral Expert appointed by the World Bank to address technical differences.
    • Court of Arbitration to resolve disputes over treaty interpretation.

Significance of the Indus Water Treaty

• Cross-border Water Sharing Model: The IWT remains one of the few cross-border water-sharing treaties in Asia, serving as a model of cooperation between two rival nations.
• Generous Towards Pakistan: The treaty is notable for granting 80% of the water to Pakistan, making it one of the most generous water-sharing pacts globally. In comparison, Mexico’s share under a 1944 pact with the US is much smaller.
• Functionality During Conflicts: Even during wars in 1965 and 1971, the Permanent Commission under the treaty continued functioning, highlighting its robustness.
• India’s Restraint: Despite multiple terrorist attacks (2001, 2008, 2016, and 2019), India refrained from invoking the Vienna Convention to exit the treaty, showcasing its commitment to the treaty’s principles.
• A Model for International Cooperation: The treaty has often been cited as a successful model of cooperation between nations, despite their political hostilities.

India’s Concerns

• Unequal Distribution: Under the IWT, India is allocated only 20% of the total water of the Indus system, while Pakistan receives 80%. This is viewed as disproportionately generous to the lower riparian state.
• Restrictions on Water Storage: India is allowed to build limited storage on western rivers like Indus River, Jhelum River, Chenab River (up to 3.75 MAF), but Pakistan often raises objections, halting or delaying projects. For example, projects like Tulbul Navigation and Wullar Barrage have faced multiple delays due to Pakistani opposition.

Disputes Over Hydropower Projects:

Kishenganga Project:

• • Pakistan sought arbitration from the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) over India’s Kishenganga hydropower project, arguing that the design did not comply with the IWT. Although India won the case, the prolonged legal battle delayed the project’s completion and reduced its generation capacity.

Ratle Hydroelectric Project:

• • Similar disputes emerged over the Ratle project, with Pakistan bypassing the treaty’s graded dispute resolution mechanism and directly seeking international arbitration. This not only delayed the project but also added financial costs for India.

Outdated Provisions:

• •  The treaty does not account for the growing impact of climate change on water availability. A World Bank study (2020) has noted that the rate of glacier retreat in the Indus River Basin has accelerated over the past few decades. The report highlights that while increased melt in the short term may lead to more water availability, in the long term, the depletion of glaciers will reduce water flow, especially during the summer months when agricultural demand is highest.

Population Growth:

• • India’s population has grown over threefold since the treaty’s signing, increasing the demand for water for agriculture, industry, and domestic consumption, yet the treaty’s provisions remain unchanged.

Environmental Impact:

• • Modern concerns, such as environmental sustainability and the need for an integrated approach to river basin management, are not addressed, limiting India’s ability to respond to contemporary water challenges. The division of the rivers between India and Pakistan has had a negative impact on aquatic biodiversity. The Indus River Dolphin, for example, is now critically endangered, with only a few hundred remaining, primarily due to habitat fragmentation caused by dam construction and water diversions.
  • The Indus Water Treaty does not account for the issue of silt accumulation in the river systems, particularly in the western rivers controlled by Pakistan. The lack of silt management has caused problems for both countries. In Pakistan, the Tarbela Dam on the Indus River faces significant silt deposition, reducing its water storage capacity and power generation efficiency.

Economic Losses to Indian States:

• • A report by the Jammu & Kashmir government indicates that the state has suffered economic losses of around INR 6,500 crore annually due to the inability to utilize the western rivers fully for irrigation and hydropower under the IWT.

Punjab and Haryana:

• • The canal systems in these regions are underutilized due to restricted water flow from the Indus basin. According to the Central Ground Water Board (CGWB) report (2020), groundwater in over 80% of Punjab and 60% of Haryana is over-exploited, mainly due to insufficient surface water supply. With limited water availability from the Indus basin, farmers in these states rely heavily on groundwater for irrigation, causing severe depletion of aquifers.

Canal System Underutilization:

• • The Punjab Water Resources Management and Development Corporation reports that canal systems in Punjab have the potential to irrigate around 4.3 million hectares, but due to restricted water flow from the Indus basin, only 3.2 million hectares are currently being irrigated through these systems.

Energy Production Losses:

• • Several hydroelectric projects in Jammu & Kashmir have faced delays, causing potential energy generation losses and slowing down infrastructure development in the region. Jammu & Kashmir has a hydroelectric potential of 20,000 MW, of which only about 3,500 MW has been realized so far. Projects like the Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project (330 MW) and the Ratle Hydroelectric Project (850 MW) have faced significant delays due to disputes under the Indus Water Treaty and objections raised by Pakistan.
  • A report from the Jammu & Kashmir Power Development Corporation (JKPDC) indicates that the state has suffered estimated financial losses of over ₹6,000 crore annually due to delays in fully utilizing its hydroelectric potential.

Pakistan’s Concerns

• Downstream Vulnerabilities: Pakistan, as the lower riparian state, has expressed concerns that Indian projects on the western rivers, such as the Baglihar Dam on the Chenab River and the Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project on the Jhelum River, could reduce downstream water availability. In 2005, Pakistan took the Baglihar Dam dispute to the World Bank, claiming that the design would allow India to control the flow of water during critical agricultural periods. Although the neutral expert ruled in favor of India on some issues, the dispute highlighted Pakistan’s vulnerability to upstream developments.
  • • Kishanganga Project (2018): Pakistan argued that the diversion of the Kishanganga River, a tributary of the Jhelum, would significantly reduce water flow to the Neelum Valley in Pakistan, affecting agriculture and drinking water supplies. The Permanent Court of Arbitration allowed India to proceed with the project but emphasized the need for maintaining environmental flows to mitigate Pakistan’s concerns.

Accusations of Water Terrorism:

• • Pakistan has frequently accused India of attempting to reduce water flows to Pakistan by building dams and barrages. One notable example is the Shahpurkandi Barrage Project on the Ravi River. Although India has clarified that the project is within the parameters of the Indus Water Treaty and meant to optimize water use on the eastern rivers (which India is entitled to), Pakistan termed it an act of “water terrorism,” accusing India of weaponizing water in retaliation for political tensions. Pakistan’s fears are primarily linked to India using the barrage to restrict or manipulate water flow during the growing season in Pakistan’s Punjab region.

Environmental Flow:  

• • In 2013, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled that India is obliged to maintain a minimum flow of water downstream of the Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project to ensure the environmental sustainability of the Jhelum River. Pakistan had argued that the diversion of water would reduce the flow into the Neelum Valley, harming the local ecosystem and agriculture. The PCA mandated that India must release a minimum environmental flow of 9 cubic meters per second (cumecs) to mitigate the impact of the dam on downstream users in Pakistan.

Concern Over Future Projects:

• • Pakistan remains concerned that India’s future infrastructure projects on the western rivers may not adequately account for environmental flows, potentially exacerbating water shortages and harming downstream ecosystems. Pakistan insists that environmental considerations, like maintaining ecological balance and ensuring sufficient water for agriculture, must be prioritized in any future projects.

Consequences of Termination or Abrogation of the IWT

• Geopolitical Tensions: Any attempt to renegotiate or abrogate the IWT could escalate tensions between India and Pakistan, potentially leading to water conflicts between the nuclear-armed neighbors.
• Regional Instability: Instability in the Indus basin could have ripple effects on water cooperation with other neighboring countries like Afghanistan and China.
• Damage to India’s International Reputation: Unilaterally withdrawing from the treaty may harm India’s standing as a responsible global power, complicating future water-sharing agreements, such as the Teesta River negotiations with Bangladesh.

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Way Forward

• Incorporating Ecological Concerns: Future revisions should address ecological perspectives, including environmental flows to preserve ecosystems, as recommended by the Brisbane Declaration.
• Addressing Climate Change: Both countries should work together to manage the impacts of climate change on the Indus basin, possibly renegotiating certain provisions under the ‘change in circumstances’ clause.
• Enhanced Data Sharing: A World Bank-supervised data-sharing mechanism could help monitor changes in water quality and flow, ensuring greater transparency between both countries.
• Aligning with International Legal Standards: The treaty’s provisions should be updated to align with global water-sharing standards, such as the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention.
• India’s Full Utilization of Allocated Waters: India should take proactive measures, such as upgrading canal systems in Punjab and Rajasthan, to fully utilize its share of the Indus waters.
• Leveraging Pressure Tactics:
  In case of future hostilities from Pakistan, India could consider suspending meetings of the Permanent Commission to stall the treaty’s dispute resolution process.