Conflict Between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy

Champakam Dorairajan v the State of Madras,1951

Background

• • In the 1950s, a quota system was in place for admissions to educational institutions in Madras. 
  • A Government order had been passed in 1927 (in Madras presidency) under which caste based reservation in government jobs and college seats was provided. 
  • Smt. Champakam Dorairajan, a Brahmin was unable to get admission into the medical college even with her qualifying marks due to being a Brahmin. So, she filed an application under Article 226 relating to infringement of her fundamental rights. 

• It was alleged that not getting admission was a violation of her rights under Article 15 (1) i.e. non – discrimination by state against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them and article 29 (2) i.e. The state must not refuse admission to educational institutions it manages or ones that receive its support based solely on race, religion, caste, language, or similar factors.

• Similarly, another petition was filed in the Madras High court by a student C.R. Srinivasan related to not getting admission in engineering college even with her qualifying marks (She had obtained 369/450 marks). Both Dorairajan and Srinivasan had requested a writ of Mandamus to annul the Government order. 
• The Madras High court in its judgment had struck down the Government order because the reservation system based on caste was against the constitution of India. Later, the Madras state appealed in the Supreme court against this judgment of the High court. 

Upheld the Madras High court Judgment

• The Supreme Court upheld the Madras High Court judgement, which had struck down the Government Order passed in 1927. The Supreme court held that the classification issued in the Government Order issued by the State of Madras was based on religion, race and caste and was a clear violation of the constitution of India. The court held that such reservation violated Article 16(2), Article 15(1) and Article 29(2). 

Upheld the Superiority of Fundamental right

• In this case the state had claimed that it had the right to maintain such government order under the provisions of Article 46 of the constitution. Article 46 is a directive principle which provides state  the power to promote the educational and economic interest of weaker sections. Such provisions need to be made mainly for the SCs and STs to protect them from any kind of social injustice. This prompted the inquiry into whether all fundamental rights surpass the Directive Principles of State Policy.
• In the case, the Court gave primacy to the Fundamental rights. It held that whenever there was conflict between Fundamental rights and DPSP, the Fundamental rights would prevail. It held that Directive principles have to confirm and run subsidiary to the fundamental rights. It was held by the court that the fundamental right could be amended by the Parliament by enacting constitutional amendment acts. 

 First Constitutional Amendment

Golaknath vs State of Punjab, 1967

Background

Two issues were dealt by the court in this case

Is the Constitutional Amendment considered a ‘law’ in the context of Article 13?  

• • Reversed its previous Judgments: In this case the court reversed its earlier judgment of Shankari Prasad case which was reiterated in the Sajjan Singh case. In both these cases the court had opined that ‘law’ did not mean amendment and Article 368 granted power to amend all parts of the constitution including Fundamental rights. 

• Amendment is a law under Article 13: The court held that a constitutional amendment under Article 368 of the Constitution was an ordinary ‘law’ within the meaning of Article 13(3) of the Constitution. Thus, no major difference existed between ordinary legislative power of the parliament and the inherent constituent power of parliament to amend the Constitution. 

Whether Fundamental rights could be amended or not?

• Sacrosanct nature of Fundamental rights: The judgment left Parliament with no power to curtail Fundamental rights. Article 13 (2) states that Parliament is unable to enact any legislation that limits the Fundamental Rights outlined in Part III of the Constitution. Therefore, constitutional amendment, also being an ordinary law within the meaning of Article 13, could not violate fundamental rights. Thus, all constitutional amendments, passed thus far, which were in contravention or which had made an exception to the fundamental rights chapter, were held void. In this case, it was also held by the court that Fundamental rights are sacrosanct and they could not be amended even for implementation of Directive principles. 

The 24th and 25th Constitutional Amendments

• New amendment introduced: Two amendments i.e. the 24th and 25th constitutional amendment were brought by the Parliament. The 24th Constitutional Amendment stated that Parliament possesses the authority to restrict or eliminate any of the Fundamental Rights through amendments and required the President to provide his approval for the constitutional amendment bill. The 25th Amendment introduced a new Article 31C. 
• Provisions under Article 31 C: Article 31C contained 2 main provisions: 
  • Any law that seeks to implement Article 39 (b) and Article 39 (c) cannot be challenged in the Court on the grounds that it violated Article 14, 19 and 31(Right to Property). (This provision was upheld in the Kesavananda Judgment) 
  • No law containing a declaration for giving effect to such a policy shall be questioned in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such a policy. (This provision was invalidated in the Kesavananda Judgment.)